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Where There’s Smoke: 
Employer Policies on Smoking
Sandra M. Tomkowicz and Susan K. Lessack
In response to a recent Surgeon General’s Report highlighting the dangers of 
secondhand smoke, employers may be increasingly pressed to balance the rights of 
smokers and non-smokers. Policies that attempt to control off-the-job smoking pose 
higher litigation risks than policies targeted specifi cally at eliminating smoke in the 
workplace. Failing to provide a smoke-free environment also may pose a risk of 
litigation to employers. 
On June 27, 2006, the US Surgeon General issued a report, The Health Consequences of Involuntary Exposure to Tobacco Smoke, which 
concludes that “there is no risk-free level of exposure to secondhand 
smoke.”1 The report recognizes that restrictions on workplace smoking 
are effective in reducing secondhand smoke exposure, but the only sure 
means of eliminating secondhand smoke exposure in the work environ-
ment is to maintain a smoke-free workplace. In the wake of the Surgeon 
General’s report, employer efforts to address the spectrum of issues 
posed by smoking and smokers in the workplace are likely to take cen-
ter stage in a growing national debate. In all states except Montana, the 
common law doctrine of employment at-will affords an employer ample 
latitude to make decisions affecting its employees.2 Despite the broad 
scope of at-will employment, employers need to consider the legal 
landscape of statutory restrictions and common law causes of action in 
making any decisions designed to respond to the growing concern over 
the dangers of smoke. To avoid “getting burned,” employers should take 
a comprehensive approach, with appreciation for potential claims that 
could arise from smokers and non-smokers alike. 
Even before the release of this latest report from the Surgeon General, 
news stories had suggested that employers were becoming increasingly 
aggressive about eliminating smoking in the workplace and its attendant 
costs not only by imposing on-the-job bans, but also by adopting poli-
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cies based on employees’ off-the-job activities. Weyco Inc., a medical 
benefi ts administrator from Okemos, Michigan, gained national atten-
tion when it gave employees an ultimatum either to quit smoking or 
be fi red.3 Kimball Physics, a manufacturer of scientifi c instruments in 
Wilton, New Hampshire, has banned not only the use but also the pos-
session of tobacco in company buildings and prohibits “tobacco-residu-
als” emitting persons (defi ned as anyone who has used a tobacco prod-
uct within the previous two hours) from entering its workplace.4 And, 
a growing number of employers are imposing higher benefi t premiums 
on smokers or offering incentives for cessation.5 
These employers are motivated by a number of factors, including ris-
ing health care costs, pressure to increase productivity, and resentment 
of smokers by non-smokers arising from the perceptions that smokers 
take more frequent breaks and increase the health care cost burden on 
non-smokers. Regardless of the motivation, employers need to consider 
carefully the potential legal implications of adopting policies targeted at 
smokers or making employment decisions based on whether an indi-
vidual smokes. 
No-smoking policies, whether imposed on or off the job, carry con-
sequences for both employers and employees. For employers, such 
policies may affect a hiring or retention decision, which begs the ques-
tion: can smokers sue for alleged discrimination based on their status 
as smokers? For employees, differential treatment of smokers may hit 
home in the area of health care benefi ts, often causing smokers to pay 
a greater share of benefi ts than non-smokers. Even non-smokers have 
a stake in how their employers address smoking in their work environ-
ments, and some have brought claims that smoking in their workplaces 
has caused them harm. Future claims of this type are likely to rely on 
the recent Surgeon General’s report and its conclusion that a smoke-
free workplace is the only effective means of eliminating the risk of 
secondhand smoke exposure at work. As the debate about the potential 
harmful effects of smoking and inhalation of secondhand smoke by 
non-smokers continues, the potential for litigation in this area is likely 
to increase. 
NO-SMOKING POLICIES IN THE WORKPLACE 
A growing number of cities and states have enacted statutes that 
explicitly ban smoking in the workplace; others achieve this result by 
imposing bans on smoking in public places, including places where 
employees work.6 In these states, employers have a statutory obliga-
tion to ensure a smoke-free workplace for employees. In the absence 
of legislation, employers still may choose to implement a policy that 
bans smoking on the job and on employer premises.7 Employers must 
be careful to monitor and enforce the policy uniformly to avoid running 
afoul of federal and state anti-discrimination statutes that protect indi-
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viduals from adverse employment actions or working conditions on the 
basis of protected characteristics. 
To illustrate, enforcement of a no-smoking policy could implicate 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which makes it unlawful for 
an employer “…to discriminate against any individual with respect to 
his…conditions, or privileges of employment…because of such individ-
ual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”8 Consistent with the 
language and intent of the statute, courts have long recognized that 
“Title VII applies…not only to the more blatant forms of discrimina-
tion, but also the subtler forms, such as discriminatory enforcement of 
work rules.”9 In Moore v. Inmont Corp.,10 for example, an employer suc-
cessfully defended a claim of disparate treatment on the basis of race 
brought by an employee whom it terminated pursuant to the company’s 
no-smoking/automatic termination policy. The employee could not pro-
duce any evidence that the company had failed to apply its policy in 
an evenhanded manner to all employees, regardless of race. Although 
the plaintiff employee in Moore was not successful, Moore reminds 
employers of two very important propositions. First, compliance with a 
no-smoking on-the-job policy must be enforced in a consistent manner, 
and there should be a plan for monitoring enforcement to ensure that 
the policy is not being used to “target” certain employees while afford-
ing leniency to others.11 Employers should investigate all complaints 
alleging violations of the no-smoking policy with the same degree of 
diligence. Second, the consequences for violating the policy should be 
delineated clearly and imposed uniformly. Inconsistent monitoring or 
unequal imposition of discipline for violations could lead to a claim for 
disparate treatment in contravention of federal and state anti-discrimina-
tion statutes.12 
NO-SMOKING POLICIES GOVERNING OFF-DUTY SMOKING
More diffi cult questions arise when an employer seeks to implement 
a policy, such as hiring and retaining only non-smokers, that adversely 
affects an applicant or employee who engages in smoking off the job. 
Presently, 30 states and the District of Columbia have enacted “lifestyle” 
statutes that limit an employer’s ability to make adverse employment 
decisions about an employee based upon an employee’s lawful activities 
or use of lawful products while off-duty and away from the employer’s 
premises.13 As a practical matter, these lifestyle statutes may restrict, to 
varying degrees, an employer’s ability to terminate an employee or deny 
a job to an applicant who smokes tobacco.14 A policy of retaining and 
hiring only non-smokers, therefore, likely would be unlawful in these 
states. 
In states without lifestyle discrimination statutes, some employers are 
choosing not to hire or retain smokers. These employers also are not 
without risk of potential claims. Unless the policy is followed for every 
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applicant and employee, an employer may face disparate treatment claims 
from smokers who are denied employment or retention and who are in 
different protected classes than smokers who are hired or retained. In 
addition, if an employer tests applicants or employees for the presence 
of nicotine, the employer may be subject to a common law tort claim 
for invasion of privacy (developed by state court judges based on cases, 
not statutes). This tort claim is defi ned as follows: “One who intention-
ally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of 
another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other 
for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to 
a reasonable person.”15 Although the courts have not yet addressed an 
invasion of privacy claim specifi cally in this context, an employee could 
argue that a test for the presence of nicotine by breathalyzer, urinalysis, 
or blood constitutes a “highly offensive” intrusion if an employer fails to 
carefully monitor the circumstances under which the test is administered.16 
To reduce the risk of an invasion of privacy claim, employers should, at a 
minimum, follow the existing state (or relevant federal) statutory require-
ments applicable to drug testing or, in their absence, otherwise ensure 
that employee privacy interests are respected.17 
Another potential claim arising from testing for the presence of nico-
tine is a wrongful discharge claim. If an employer terminates a current 
employee for refusing to take, or failing, a test for nicotine, the employ-
ee may raise a claim for the tort of wrongful discharge. The scope of a 
wrongful discharge claim varies widely among the states, and its success 
in connection with testing for nicotine would depend upon the extent 
to which each state’s courts acknowledge an employee’s right to privacy 
regarding off-duty conduct.18 
An employer also might be subject to a disparate impact claim of 
discrimination based on a policy of hiring only non-smokers. In theory, 
a disparate impact claim is based upon the rationale that an employer 
should not be permitted, unless necessary to its business operations, 
to implement a policy or practice that appears to apply neutrally to all 
applicants or employees, but in fact tends to disproportionately screen 
out (or affect more harshly) individuals according to certain demo-
graphic characteristics, such as sex, race, or ethnicity. The success of a 
disparate impact claim likely will turn on statistics refl ecting the demo-
graphic characteristics of smokers. 
A disparate impact claim would be predicated on the argument that a 
preferential hiring policy for non-smokers adversely impacts a discrete 
class of individuals protected from discrimination under one or more 
of the federal or state anti-discrimination statutes, such as Title VII.19 
Specifi cally, Title VII recognizes that it is unlawful for an employer to 
use “a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact 
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin” unless the 
employer “demonstrate[s] that the challenged practice is job related for 
the position in question and consistent with business necessity.”20 An 
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employee can prove a disparate impact claim by demonstrating that the 
employer’s practice causes a disparate impact and that the employer 
has refused to implement an alternative practice that would achieve the 
asserted business objectives without resulting in the disparate effect.21 
If an employer implements a hiring policy that excludes smokers, 
a smoker who is denied a job would need to demonstrate that he or 
she is a member of a protected class that is adversely affected by this 
policy.22 For example, according to the most recent statistics published 
by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention for 2004, it is unlikely 
that a protected class of employees could show that a hiring policy that 
excludes smokers would result in a disparate impact on the basis of 
gender, race, or ethnicity, with one exception for the American Indians/
Alaska Natives population. Analyzing the adult population by gender, 
23.4 percent of men and 18.5 percent of women in the United States 
smoke.23 Therefore, 77 out of 100 men compared with 82 out of 100 
women do not smoke and would not be excluded from consideration 
for a job. Because a preferential hiring policy would not disproportion-
ately affect one gender over another, no disparate impact based upon 
gender would be demonstrated.24 
Similarly, no disparate impact based upon race or ethnicity exists 
according to data refl ecting the number of smokers in the following 
racial and ethnic groups: non-Hispanic Whites (22.2 percent of whom 
smoke), non-Hispanic Blacks (20.2 percent of whom smoke), Hispanics 
(15.0 percent of whom smoke) and Asians (11.3 percent of whom 
smoke).25 The exception is the American Indians/Alaska Natives popu-
lation, which has the highest incidence of smokers (33.4 percent), and 
could establish a prima facie case of disparate impact based on the 
present statistics.26 
If an employee could show a disparate impact, the employer would 
then need to prove the “job-relatedness” and “business necessity” for 
the preferential hiring policy. It is diffi cult to conceive of a rationale for 
denying all positions to all smokers on the basis that only non-smokers 
can perform the required tasks and, therefore, the preferential hiring 
policy is “job-related.” Moreover, even if an employer could justify the 
“job-relatedness” and “business necessity” of its policy, the employee 
still has the opportunity to prevail on a claim by proving that an alter-
native practice exists that would not result in a disparate impact. For 
example, the employer could establish a more focused policy directed 
specifi cally at prohibiting all employees from smoking in the workplace 
and on company property (if secondhand smoke exposure or extended 
breaks for smokers is the concern) or implement a bona fi de wellness 
program27 (if allocating health care costs more equitably is the ratio-
nale). Although the risks of a disparate impact claim are not substantial 
based upon the above analysis, employers should periodically assess the 
potential for such a claim in the event that the demographic make-up of 
smokers changes signifi cantly in the future. 
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SMOKING AS A DISABILITY
A smoker who is denied employment or subjected to adverse employ-
ment action because he or she smokes also may bring a disability discrim-
ination claim. The ADA provides: “No covered entity shall discriminate 
against a qualifi ed individual with a disability because of the disability 
of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, 
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job 
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.”28 
To establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment under the ADA 
and parallel state anti-discrimination laws, the plaintiff must show, among 
other things, that he or she is disabled29—that he or she has “a physical 
or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of his [or her] 
major life activities,” “a record of such impairment,” or that he or she was 
“regarded a having such an impairment.”30 Conceivably, a smoker could 
bring claims for disability discrimination and/or “regarded as” disability 
discrimination if an employer refuses to hire him or her or makes other 
adverse employment decisions affecting him or her. As a threshold mat-
ter, a smoker would have to show that smoking substantially impairs a 
major life activity. To the extent that a smoker is addicted to nicotine, the 
smoker suffers from an addiction disorder recognized by the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.31 Arguably, just as addiction 
to alcohol constitutes a disability under the ADA,32 so could addiction to 
nicotine. If smoking or addiction to nicotine is a disability, employers 
would be prohibited from refusing to hire a smoker because he or she 
smokes.33 Although the EEOC has taken the position that smoking itself is 
not a disability (because it is an activity rather than impairment), the EEOC 
left room for the possibility that addiction to nicotine could be a disability 
if the addiction substantially limits a major life activity.34 
Most courts that have considered the issue have ruled that the smoking 
plaintiffs in those cases were not disabled. In Stevens v. Inland Waters, 
Inc.,35 the Court of Appeals of Michigan affi rmed summary judgment in 
favor of the employer on the employee’s claim of disability discrimina-
tion. The employee argued that the employer’s requirement that he quit 
smoking both on and off the job constituted disability discrimination. 
The appellate court disagreed, holding that the employee’s smoking and 
addiction to nicotine did not substantially limit his major life activities 
notwithstanding the effect on his ability to choose not to smoke and his 
ability to be without discomfort when not smoking. 
In another case that reached a similar result, the US District Court for 
the District of Maryland stated: 
“[C]ommon sense compels the conclusion that smoking, whether 
denominated as ‘nicotine addiction’ or not, is not a ‘disability’ within the 
meaning of the ADA. Congress could not possibly have intended the 
absurd result of including smoking within the defi nition of ‘disability,’ 
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which would render somewhere between 25% and 30% of the American 
public disabled under federal law because they smoke.”36
The court further reasoned that because nicotine addiction is “readily 
remediable,” it does not constitute a disability under the ADA. 
Given the diffi culty in mounting a successful claim that smoking is 
a disability, a more likely claim from a smoker who is denied employ-
ment or suffers another adverse employment action is a “regarded as” or 
“perceived” disability claim. The regulations underlying the ADA defi ne 
a “regarded as” disability as
“(1) ha[ving] a physical or mental impairment that does not 
substantially limit major life activities but is treated by a covered 
entity as constituting such limitation; (2) ha[ving] a physical or 
mental impairment that substantially limits major life activities only 
as a result of the attitudes of others toward such impairment; or 
(3) ha[ving] none of the [physical or mental] impairments defi ned 
in [the regulations] but is treated by a covered entity as having a 
substantially limiting impairment.”37 
In any case, “it is necessary that [the employer] entertain misperceptions 
about the individual.”38 
The most likely “regarded as” claim would be an argument that the 
employer mistakenly believes that smokers are substantially impaired 
and therefore make less productive employees. For example, an 
employer might perceive that, as a result of smoking, an employee is 
less energetic or more prone to being ill and missing time from work. 
If the employer’s fear amounts to a concern that smoking or the effects 
of smoking constitute a substantial impairment, then an employee may 
at least be able to state a prima facie case of perceived disability dis-
crimination. If an employee can state a prima facie case, the employer 
must articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for not hiring or 
for making another adverse employment decision affecting a smoker. 
Although this step of the burden of proof is usually pro forma, employ-
ers may have more diffi culty in this context if the reason for not wanting 
smokers as employees stems from the concern that smokers are more 
likely to use sick days or to be less energetic and productive. That think-
ing may be viewed as refl ecting an employer’s bias toward smoking-
related health issues that themselves may be disabilities. For example, 
if a smoker develops a condition caused by smoking, such as emphy-
sema, a heart condition, or lung cancer, use of sick leave or decreased 
productivity could be due to the effects of that condition rather than to 
the act of smoking itself. Consequently, an employer making a decision 
that is based on a smoker’s use of sick leave or decreased productivity 
may fi nd itself in the position of defending a more diffi cult claim of dis-
crimination based on a disability that is easier to prove, like emphysema 
or cancer. 
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DIFFERENTIAL BENEFIT COSTS FOR SMOKERS 
Rather than take the aggressive position of refusing to hire smokers, 
many employers have instead imposed higher benefi t premiums or 
deductibles on smokers based on the view that smokers incur higher 
health care costs; requiring smokers to pay a greater portion of those 
costs than non-smokers is simply a fair distribution of an employer’s 
expenses. Another approach offers discounts to smokers who partici-
pate in smoking cessation or other programs. The Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) generally prohibits 
employers from discriminating on the basis of an employee’s health 
condition in determining benefi t premiums or contributions. But, 
HIPAA recognizes an exception for a “bona fi de wellness program,” 
and allows an employer to require a higher payment from employees 
who do not comply with the requirements of a bona fi de wellness pro-
gram.39 Similarly, the ADA permits employee benefi t plans to impose 
different conditions on disabled persons provided that the difference 
is based on underwriting risks and is not a subterfuge to avoid the 
dictates of the ADA.40
Under proposed regulations published in 2001 (fi nal rules have not 
yet been circulated) by the US Department of Labor, US Department of 
Health and Human Services, and the Internal Revenue Service, a bona 
fi de wellness program must have four attributes:
1. The total reward (e.g., a discount, waiver of a co-payment, or 
absence of a surcharge) given to an individual must be limited 
(with a suggested limit of 10 to 20 percent of the total cost of 
employee-only coverage);
2. The program must be reasonably designed to promote good 
health or prevent disease (so, for example, participants 
should have the opportunity to qualify for the reward at least 
once per year);
3. The reward must be available to all similarly situated individu-
als, meaning that the program must provide an alternative to 
individuals for whom it is unreasonably diffi cult or medically 
inadvisable (because of a health condition) to satisfy the pro-
gram’s requirements; and
4. All plan materials describing the terms of the program must 
disclose the availability of a reasonable alternative standard.41 
If an employer’s bona fi de wellness plan meets these standards, the 
employer may impose payment differentials based on whether an indi-
vidual complies with the plan. An employer may require, for instance, 
that a smoker who refuses to participate in a smoking cessation pro-
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gram (or a reasonable alternative) pay a higher benefi t premium than 
other employees.
The proposed regulations address specifi cally the design of a bona 
fi de wellness plan that seeks to curb employee tobacco use. In Example 
6, the regulations review the following situation: a group health plan 
imposes a 10 to 20 percent surcharge on participants who are unable to 
certify that they have not used tobacco products within the preceding 12 
months. In accordance with the requirements for a bona fi de wellness 
program, the benefi t plan materials provide that, if it is unreasonably dif-
fi cult for an employee to stop smoking because of a nicotine addiction, 
the employee may participate in a smoking cessation program to avoid 
the surcharge during his or her participation, regardless of whether the 
employee actually stops smoking. The design of this program passes 
muster under the proposed regulations, which recognize that nicotine 
addiction is a medical condition that could make it unreasonably diffi -
cult for an employee to quit using tobacco products.42 Designing a bona 
fi de wellness program offers employers a way of controlling health costs 
and incenting its employees to quit smoking.
POTENTIAL CLAIMS FROM NON-SMOKERS
Although the present trend is towards prohibiting smoke in the work-
place, some employers either continue to allow smoking on-the-job or 
on company property or fail to consistently monitor and enforce existing 
smoking bans in their workplaces. Those employers risk potential law-
suits from non-smokers under the federal ADA (and parallel state disabil-
ity discrimination statutes) and state workers’ compensation statutes. 
Unlike most federal statutes that ban discrimination in employment, 
the ADA imposes a unique affi rmative duty on employers. Specifi cally, 
the ADA requires an employer to provide a reasonable accommodation 
to an applicant or employee with a disability who is otherwise quali-
fi ed for the position, but who needs an accommodation to perform the 
essential functions of the job.43 A reasonable accommodation includes 
“modifi cations or adjustments to the work environment.”44 A reasonable 
accommodation must be provided unless it imposes on the employer an 
“undue hardship,”45 defi ned as “an action requiring signifi cant diffi culty 
or expense.”46 
In recent years, courts have seen a spate of cases brought by indi-
viduals who assert that they are disabled within the meaning of the 
ADA because of their sensitivity to smoke, and claim that they need the 
reasonable accommodation of working in a smoke-free environment 
or some other related modifi cations to their working conditions. For 
an employee seeking to state a claim for failure to accommodate, the 
most diffi cult hurdle to overcome is proving that he or she is disabled 
within the meaning of the ADA. Many of the cases raising this claim 
fail because the employee is unable to meet the highly individualized 
Employer Policies on Smoking
Employee Relations Law Journal 57 Vol. 32, No. 3, Winter 2006
burden of proving that he or she has a disability and, therefore, quali-
fi es for the ADA’s protection.47 For example, an employee with asthma 
may or may not be disabled within the meaning of the ADA. Whether 
the asthma rises to the level of a disability depends upon whether the 
impairment substantially limits a major life activity, such as breathing, of 
that particular employee.48 If an employee meets the threshold require-
ment of establishing a disability covered by the ADA,49 an employer 
must be prepared to demonstrate either that it has met its affi rmative 
obligation to provide a reasonable accommodation or that providing the 
accommodation would pose an “undue hardship.”50 To meet its burden, 
the employer must communicate with the employee to determine what 
accommodation(s) would be effective. The EEOC regulations require an 
employer to engage in a “fl exible, interactive process” with its employee 
that is directed towards identifying a reasonable accommodation.51 An 
employer who complies with the regulations and engages in a “good 
faith” discussion with its employee should be better able to defend 
against a claim for failure to accommodate and to protect itself from 
punitive damages.52 
Recent cases highlight two important considerations for any employer 
faced with a request for a reasonable accommodation based upon an 
employee’s sensitivity to smoke and smoke residue. First, as in any cir-
cumstance where an employee requests a reasonable accommodation, 
an employer must engage in an interactive dialogue with the employee. 
One recent decision shows the danger in failing to appreciate fully the 
nature of an employee’s smoke-related disability and in making only 
half-hearted efforts to work collaboratively with the employee to accom-
modate the disability. In Bond v. Sheahan,53 a correctional offi cer (Bond) 
claimed that her employer, the Cook County Department of Corrections 
(CCDOC), discriminated against her by, among other things, failing to 
provide a smoke-free environment as a reasonable accommodation for 
her asthma. Although CCDOC transferred Bond to other work areas, the 
court was not persuaded that CCDOC had met its legal obligation to 
Bond in light of Bond’s assertions that the transfers did not eliminate her 
exposure to smoke and were not intended as an accommodation. The 
court further observed that CCDOC failed to alert Bond to vacant posi-
tions in an area of the workplace that was, in Bond’s estimation, the one 
genuine smoke-free environment. The court’s skepticism of CCDOC’s 
efforts is revealed most plainly in its repeated references to CCDOC’s 
“so-called reasonable accommodations.” Based upon the above and 
other evidence, the court denied the CCDOC’s motion for summary 
judgment, sending the case to trial on whether CCDOC had reasonably 
accommodated Bond. 
Second, an employer should not assume that the mere existence of a 
no-smoking policy would satisfy its obligation to provide a reasonable 
accommodation. Ironically, CCDOC did enact two different no-smoking 
policies over a period of years, from which, the CCDOC argued, Bond 
Employer Policies on Smoking
Vol. 32, No. 3, Winter 2006 58 Employee Relations Law Journal
benefi ted. Bond asserted that these policies were not effective accommo-
dations because the policies were never enforced, and the court agreed. 
In Service v. Union Pacifi c Railroad Co.,54 another case reaching the 
same result, a locomotive engineer (Service) argued that his asthma 
was exacerbated by exposure to smoke and smoke residue, and that 
Union Pacifi c had failed to provide him with a smoke-free environment. 
Here too, Union Pacifi c had implemented a no-smoking policy whereby 
“smoking [was] permitted in locomotive cabs, cabooses, company and 
crew hauling vehicles only if all occupants [were] agreeable.” The court 
acknowledged that the policy may have reasonably accommodated 
Service’s need to avoid direct contact with smoke, but it failed to address 
his sensitivity to smoke residue (which remained in the locomotive cab 
after other employees smoked before Service’s shift). In addition, the 
court determined that Union Pacifi c could not prove that it would have 
been an undue hardship to accommodate Service’s request when it had 
instituted a company-wide no-smoking policy two years after Service 
had suffered a severe asthmatic attack (and was permitted to return to 
work only after the new no-smoking policy was implemented). The 
lesson here is to review carefully the scope of any no-smoking policy 
and its specifi c application to situations in which employees must be 
insulated not only from smoke, but also smoke residue. 
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CLAIMS 
In addition to potential failure to accommodate claims from employ-
ees whose disabilities are aggravated by smoking in the workplace, 
the possibility of workers’ compensation claims based on exposure 
to secondhand smoke or “environmental tobacco smoke” also exists. 
Employees who believe they were injured at work as a result of smok-
ing by coworkers have fi led workers’ compensation claims on the 
theory that their injuries were work-related. 
To establish a workers’ compensation claim, an employee usually 
(depending on the state’s workers’ compensation statute) has to prove 
either (1) that he or she contracted an occupational disease that is directly 
related to the nature of the employee’s job; or (2) that he or she suffered 
an accidental injury that arose out of or during the course of employment. 
Accidental injury has been construed to mean an unexpected hazard, 
rather than an ordinary incident of working in a particular environment. 
It does not need to be a sudden event and can occur gradually over time, 
as injuries resulting from exposure to secondhand smoke often do.
Courts have reached varying results in considering the question of 
whether injuries caused by secondhand smoke are occupational diseases 
or accidental injuries under the controlling workers’ compensation stat-
ute. For example, the New York Court of Appeals ruled in Johannesen 
v. New York City Dep’t of Housing Preservation and Development,55 that 
the employee’s bronchial asthma, which was aggravated by exposure 
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to tobacco smoke at work, constituted an “accidental injury” under the 
New York workers’ compensation statute. The employee in that case 
worked as an offi ce assistant in an unventilated space, in close proxim-
ity to approximately 50 other employees, one half of whom smoked. 
The court held that the employee was entitled to workers’ compensation 
because the work environment exacerbated her preexisting asthma con-
dition. On the other hand, the Nevada Supreme Court held in Palmer 
v. Del Webb’s High Sierra,56 that a casino worker who claimed he suf-
fered an occupational disease caused by inhaling tobacco smoke in the 
workplace was not entitled to workers’ compensation benefi ts because 
secondhand smoke is not an occupational disease uniquely incidental 
to casinos. Rather, “secondary smoke is a hazard to which workers, as a 
class, may be ‘equally exposed outside of employment.’” The court con-
trasted the casino worker’s claim with the situation of a coal miner who 
contracts black lung disease by inhaling coal dust, which is incidental 
to the character of coal mining. 
Employers should be cautious when deciding whether to take the 
position that an employee injured because of exposure to secondhand 
smoke is not entitled to workers’ compensation benefi ts because that 
argument may expose the employer to a negligence claim. In McCarthy 
v. State of Washington Dep’t of Social and Health Services,57 the Supreme 
Court of Washington held that an offi ce employee who was continuous-
ly exposed to cigarette smoke could pursue a negligence claim against 
her employer after she was denied workers’ compensation benefi ts. 
The Washington Department of Labor and Industries had denied the 
employee’s claim for workers’ compensation benefi ts on the ground that 
her pulmonary lung disease (which she alleged was due to secondhand 
smoke) was not an occupational disease. The employee then brought 
a common law negligence claim against her employer. Although work-
ers’ compensation is generally the exclusive remedy for claims against 
employers based on work-related injuries, the court held that the exclu-
sive remedy of the workers’ compensation statute did not apply if the 
employee’s work-related disease was found to fall outside the statute’s 
coverage. Moreover, the court ruled that the employer in that case, the 
State of Washington, had a duty to provide a safe workplace, which 
encompassed the obligation to provide a work environment reasonably 
free from tobacco smoke.
CONCLUSION
As employers attempt to address the growing concerns about the 
health hazards of smoke in the workplace and the increased costs and 
employee relations issues of having smokers in the workforce, they 
face a range of potential claims from both smokers and non-smokers. 
Employers attempting to navigate the issue fi nd little guidance in the 
sparse case law. Further, employers in states with lifestyle laws are 
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constrained in addressing off-duty smoking. Recognizing that the full 
scope of employers’ rights is yet to be determined, whatever route an 
employer decides to take should be informed by an evaluation of the 
following legal issues.
Whether to Prohibit Smoking in the Workplace 
• If the jurisdiction in which the employer does business has a law 
banning smoking in workplaces, then this question is answered 
easily. Employers complying with these no-smoking bans must 
enforce the bans consistently and uniformly or risk a claim of 
differential treatment under an anti-discrimination statute.
• If the jurisdiction in which the employer does business does not 
have a law banning smoking in the workplace, the employer 
has the right to allow smoking but should recognize the legal 
and health risks of doing so. Employees who feel harmed by 
smoke in the workplace could request that the workplace be 
smoke-free as a reasonable accommodation. Or, employees 
might claim that exposure to smoke causes injury covered by 
workers’ compensation. The recent Surgeon General’s report 
provides compelling evidence to support an employee’s claim 
that secondhand smoke exposure cannot be eliminated at 
work unless the environment is smoke-free.
Whether to Refuse to Hire/Retain Smokers
• If the jurisdiction in which the employer does business has a 
law that prohibits the employer from making decisions based 
on what an employee does outside of work (lifestyle law), 
then the employer is barred from refusing to hire or retain an 
employee based on whether the employee smokes.
• If the jurisdiction in which the employer does business does 
not have a lifestyle law, then the employer can consider 
whether making an employment decision based on an indi-
vidual’s smoking status is appropriate. In making that deci-
sion, employers should weigh the risk of potential claims from 
smokers who are not hired or retained because of the policy 
(including disability discrimination claims, other discrimination 
claims if the policy is not applied uniformly, disparate impact 
claims, and common law claims) against the risk of potential 
claims from non-smokers exposed to smoke residue on the 
smokers, in addition to the impact on health costs, productiv-
ity, and employee relations. Any approach that the employer 
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decides to take regarding smokers in the workplace should be 
used consistently.
• If the employer prefers not to ban the hiring of all smokers, it 
may consider a less aggressive alternative, such as the use of a 
bona fi de wellness program to impose higher costs on smok-
ers who decline participation in the program.
In addition to these legal considerations, employers should be mind-
ful of the broader policy implications of their decisions. Employees may 
perceive any policy directed towards controlling their off-duty conduct 
as a further encroachment upon an already diminishing sense of pri-
vacy in their personal lives. This perception is likely to affect employee 
morale and sense of loyalty toward their employers. Further, policies 
addressing off-duty smoking may limit the ability of employers to attract 
and retain talented individuals who smoke but otherwise are willing and 
able to observe more limited workplace bans on smoking. The most 
prudent course is a measured one, balancing the respective interests of 
smokers and non-smokers as well as the long-term needs and objectives 
of the business. 
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